Introduction
National Socialist persecution of the Gypsies hinged on the conception that the behavior of social groups was rooted in biological constants and genetic factors. In respect to the Sinti and Roma, this racist notion had two characteristic features: the primary target of Gypsy persecution in Germany were the putative 'Gypsy Mischlinge, ' persons of 'mixed blood' who, according to the racial hygienics theorist Robert Ritter,  had 'deviated from their original
Michael Zimmermann has specialised in his research on the Nazi persecution of the Gypsies. He is a historian at the Ruhrlandmuseum, Goethestraße , D- Essen, Germany.
Romani Studies , Vol. , No.  (), -.     -
. Ritter was head of the Research Institute for Race Hygiene and Population Biology (Rassenhygienische und Bevölkerungsbiologische Forschungsstelle) set up in , which worked together closely with the Reich Criminal Police Dept. in classifying Gypsies in terms of racial criteria. Th e institute photographed, fi ngerprinted and examined Gypsies in the Reich, building a Gypsy Clan Archive (Zigeunersippenarchiv) and preparing so-called hereditary charts (Erbtafeln). biological nature. ' Domestic policy did not target the small group of travelling Gypsies, who married only among themselves and were consequently classifi ed as 'racially pure' (Ritter : , Ritter : ) . But in the German-occupied territories aft er , precisely the reverse policy prevailed: wandering Gypsies were in greater peril than the sedentary Roma (Zimmermann : -).
Th is dichotomous feature of Roma persecution derived in turn from the focalizing of diff ering facets of the hostile image of the Gypsy Other. Outside the Reich, especially in the Eastern occupied territories, this phantasmal construct was projected chiefl y onto the itinerant Gypsies. It was argued that their 'mobile' life style merely camoufl aged spying activities against the Germans in the service of the 'Jewish-Bolshevik world enemy. ' By contrast, within the Reich proper it was believed that the main folk-racial threat stemmed from the 'part-Gypsies, ' partially or totally sedentary in lifestyle, who were allegedly 'degenerating' the 'German folk body' through their more intensive social contacts with the majority population.
National-Socialist Gypsy policy evolved over the six pre-war years of Nazi rule and was later radicalized into genocide during World War II. Th ere was no unifi ed central plan that guided this persecution; rather, it diff ered depending on geographical region and administrative area of authorization. Confl icts of interest arose with the system of Nazi rule, and sometimes policy proceeded down bureaucratic blind alleys. As a result, both in the Reich and the occupied areas in the Europe, Gypsy persecution under the Nazis was disjointed, marked by non-simultaneities and contradictions.
Th is lack of coherence also makes it diffi cult to establish the precise role played by the Wehrmacht in the overall persecution. Th e military's capability, possibilities and will to implement Gypsy policy were dependent on a multitude of factors, which the present paper explores for the Reich proper, Western Europe, Serbia and the Soviet Union.
 'Spies'
One evident element that had a formative impact on the Wehrmacht's attitude toward the Gypsies was the cliché of the 'spying Gypsy. ' Th is stereotype was historically rooted in the projective anxieties that had arisen in Europe . For a brief overview in English, see also Zimmermann . toward the end of the fi ft eenth century. Th e fi rst Gypsies to arrive reported they were from 'Little Egypt, ' and struck the local population in any case as strange and alien. Consequently, they soon were suspected of being Turkish spies if not the advance guard of hostile Ottoman armies. Within the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, Gypsies were formally fi rst declared 'enemy agents' at the parliament in Lindau . In numerous subsequent parliamentary mandates, imperial policy regulations and sixteenth-century decrees by state princes, the Gypsies were denounced as enemy agents, instituting in eff ect an open season on Gypsies: all now had the right to arrest, fl og and kill Roma at will (Breithaupt : -, , Mode and Wölffl ing : -, Gronemeyer ).
In the chronicles and cosmographies of the seventeenth century, the stereotype of the Gypsy as Turkish spy was generalized into the image of the 'enemy scout, ' now applicable to service for other foreign powers as well (Camerarius , Fritsch , Schönborner , Th omasius ) . One hundred years later, in , the Enlightener Heinrich Grellmann, who had a special interest in the 'Gypsy question, ' concurred that the accusation claiming Gypsies were 'traitors and spies' had 'a certain basis in reality. ' Moreover, Grellmann alleged there were 'all sorts of other spies' roaming around 'in the guise of Gypsies' in order inconspicuously to gather information under this cover (Grellmann ) . Th at claim represented a new facet of the vintage cliché, which would in future prove consequential.
It was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that a separate study was published in German on 'Gypsies as spies'; the treatise had little echo. Its author Th eodor Zell came to the conclusion that 'on the basis of their psychological disposition, ' 'Gypsies' were 'born' for espionage, especially since as a people close to nature, like bears, bees, reindeer and sled dogs, they had an analogous highly developed sense of orientation in the wild (Zell ).
Th e power of the Gypsy spy stereotype was especially manifest during wartime. Already in the Franco-Prussian confrontation in -, Gypsies in the Western border areas were branded as possible 'spies. ' Moreover, by pillage and plunder, they exacerbated the 'horrors and terrors of the war. ' French-German frontier or in proximity to military facilities and other strategically important sites (Hehemann : -) . What additional phantasms the cliché of the Gypsy informer was able to engender is illustrated by the example of the VIIIth Army Corps, stationed in Koblenz in World War I. In , a report was passed on there regarding the presence of a suspicious 'gang of Gypsies numbering some  persons' in the Eifel Mountains near the Belgian frontier: though they claimed to be Turks, they were actually of Serb origin. According to the report, the 'gang' had 'substantial funds' along with 'Russian steppe horses, maps of Germany and various notes written in code and in a Slavic tongue. ' Its 'preference' was to seek out Russian POWs employed as agricultural workers. Immediately following such contacts, a quite large number of prisoners had reportedly escaped, while others had refused to work. Th e report concluded it was therefore likely the 'gang' included 'enemy agents with forged passports. '  Under the impact of the revolutionary unrest aft er World War I, the Reichswehr amplifi ed such constructions by contending that 'owing to their way of life, ' Gypsies were especially suited as 'agents for the spread of Bolshevik ideas. '  Th is was the fi rst fanciful nexus forged between the stereotype of the Gypsy as espionage agent and the hostile image of Bolshevism. Th at fateful yoking would come to shape decisions taken by the command echelon in the Reichswehr and later in the Wehrmacht.
Th e German Reich aft er 
Aft er the Nazi seizure of power in January , the cliché of the foreign agent initially played no signifi cant role in Gypsy policy. But as in World War I, hostile anti-Gypsy suspicions and allegations proliferated aft er the attack on Poland and outbreak of war on September , . To take one representative example, in Gelsenkirchen the mayor, the local Wehrmacht garrison commander and fi rms such as German Petroleum Ltd., the German Iron Works and the Gelsenkirchen Mining Co. all believed that armaments production and the railroad lines were endangered by the presence of Gypsies in the city and demanded they be expelled immediately. On October ,  the RSHA cast these guidelines for how to deal with Gypsies in a concrete form, ordering restrictions on freedom of movement. 'Until their fi nal deportation, ' they are to be housed in 'special collection camps. '  During another discussion in the RSHA the end of January , it was decided the annexed Eastern provinces would fi rst be 'cleared' of Poles in the spring; in the late summer or fall of , the 'Jews in the new Eastern provinces [Gaue] and , Gypsies' were to be deported.

Th e military mishandled the implementation of these phased removals. On January , , the Wehrmacht Supreme Command (OKW) requested Himmler to 'order a ban on Gypsies in the border area as soon as possible. ' Th ey were 'unreliable, ' many were 'of questionable character and with a crim- In response, Himmler ordered the fi rst deportation of Gypsies to the Generalgouvernement, scheduled for mid-May .
 Down to the end of that year, it aff ected some , persons who were to be removed from the western and northwestern parts of the Reich, the assembly area for military operations against France, Belgium and the Netherlands. In German-occupied Poland, the majority of the Gypsy deportees were deployed like the Jews as forced laborers under SS guard, working in constructing roads, trenches, bunkers, airfi elds or concentration camps. Reliable estimates on the mortality rate of those deported in  are available only for Hamburg, indicating that by ,  percent of the deportees from the city had perished.

Th e original RSHA plans called for the deportation of additional Gypsies from the Reich to occupied Poland in the autumn of . Th at proved impossible, due to political diff erences in the Nazi top echelon and organizational diffi culties. For similar reasons, the planned 'resettlement' of the German Jews was also delayed until the autumn of . Since only some , German Gypsies were deported in , not the planned ,, the character of the camp detention in which Gypsies who remained in the Altreich (Germany in its  borders) and annexed Austria were kept altered. What had been conceived as a short-term stopgap measure became a permanent fi xture. In December , its end was not yet in sight.
Th e ban on freedom of movement was now compounded by a raft of supplementary restrictions: prohibition on various kinds of employment, social isolation in 'Gypsy community camps' (usually municipally run) and new limitations in social welfare. Th e upshot was that Gypsies found their deteriorated situation increasingly resembled that of Jews and Poles. Th e military took an active hand in enforcing curbs on employment. At the end of , the OKW declared that in order to prevent spying, it was 'inadmissible' to employ Gypsies in factories run by the Army or under military protection.
 A subsequent decree from the Reich Labor Ministry led to the dismissal of a number of Gypsies from defense industry jobs.
 Th e OKW, already hostile toward Gypsies as a result of the espionage stereotype, also engaged in racist stigmatizing of Gypsies in its own domain. As early as November , the Reich interior minister's 'Guidelines for the Induction of Non-Jewish German Citizens of Foreign Blood into Active Military Service, ' had ordered Gypsies excluded from active military service.
 Yet these orders had few practical consequences: at this juncture, the number of Gypsies classifi ed as such and stigmatized by the police and racial hygienists was still small.
So on February ,  the OKW issued a new order: for 'reasons of racial policy . . . Gypsies and Gypsy Mischlinge' were to be discharged from active military service. Th e Criminal Police (Reichskriminalpolizeiamt, RKPA) were to register those aff ected and pass on their names to the Alternative Service offi ces. Th ose who had been in the army, navy or air force were transferred to the Auxiliary Reserve II or the National Guard (Landwehr). Moreover, 'Gypsies and Gypsy Mischlinge' were no longer to be inducted as recruits.
 In a corresponding move, the Reich Interior Ministry decreed that the names of Gypsies born in the  cohort and liable for the draft should be specially coded in the Selective Service registry by the symbol 'Z' (Zigeuner) or 'ZM' (Zigeunermischling).
 But initially few Gypsies were discharged, since it was not until February  that the RKPA was instructed to gather more detailed information on 'Gypsies and Gypsy Mischlinge' in the services. Most remained with their units throughout ; many participated in the attack on the Soviet Union. Yet the Propaganda Ministry and Party Chancellery learned that  Gypsies from Berleburg had, despite the ban of their recruitment, been inducted into the army; a number had even been awarded the Iron Cross for bravery in battle. Th e Party Chancellery passed on their names and several more from other localities to the OKW, which then ordered the soldiers discharged.

Analogous to the Nuremberg Laws, the February  OKW order discharging Gypsies from active military service 'for reasons of racial policy' primarily targeted two categories: so-called 'racially pure Gypsies' (vollblütige Zigeuner) and 'part-Gypsies with a signifi cant amount of Gypsy blood. '
 Th e lower ranks of offi cers oft en interpreted this to mean that 'Gypsies whose blood was largely German' should remain in service.
 But aft er consulting with the RKPA, in overall charge of Gypsy persecution, the OKW retracted its comparatively narrow defi nition of Zigeunermischling,  tightening its regulations on July , : it now ordered all part-Gypsies, even those with one-eighth 'Gypsy blood, ' discharged from the ranks.
 Back on January , , the Reich Aviation Ministry had already issued an almost identical directive, agreed upon aft er consulting with the RKPA: it denied Gypsies and part-Gypsies the right to serve in the air force.
 Th e revised 'Guidelines for the Induction of Non-Jewish German Citizens of Foreign Blood into Active Military Service' issued by the OKW in September  modifi ed this position once again. It scaled down the demand for the absolute discharge of all Gypsies and Gypsy Mischlinge, stating instead only that 'in general' they should mustered out. Moreover, under certain conditions the reason given for discharge should no longer be 'unsuitable' but rather 'recruitment by mistake. '  Gypsies of mixed race could be 'allowed to stay on' in service if they had demonstrated their 'absolute reliability' and had proven by their 'conduct in battle' that they were 'ready for action' and that their 'fundamental attitude [was] beyond reproach. ' Th ese cautious provisos may have been prompted by the growing shortages in military manpower, but were perhaps also connected with the vigorous way in which certain superiors came to the defense of their men stigmatized as 'Gypsy Mischlinge' .
 Nonetheless, they were completely rescinded by a subsequent OKW order dated July , .
 Th rough the nexus between the RKPA and OKW, racism and the cliché of espionage, the military and paramilitary units of the Nazi state were largely 'free of Gypsies' already by early . Starting in March of that year, a substantial number of those recently mustered out of the military were deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau along with thousands of other Gypsies. Th at deportation was based on an order by Himmler on December , , itself the product of an RKPA initiative. Th is decree unifi ed and radicalized the previously quite disjointed policy of Gypsy persecution.

Th ere were some , prisoners in the Gypsy 'family camp' at Auschwitz-Birkenau in -. More than  percent of those registered were from Germany and Austria. Several hundred of them had previously served in the military (Zimmermann :  ff .,  ff .,  ff .). More than , confi ned in the Gypsy camp were murdered. Of the approximately , who survived the camp, not all lived to see the collapse of Nazi Germany. A number of men and numerous women were subjected in early  to horrible and sometimes lethal sterilization experiments in the Ravensbrück concentration camp. Others died through forced labor in other camps or external satellites, while on death marches in the fi nal weeks of the war or as impressed combat soldiers in the Waff en-SS division led by Gen. Oskar Dirlewanger. In the war's closing weeks, Gypsies who had survived Auschwitz, most former Wehrmacht veterans, were deployed in Dirlewanger's unit at the front against the advancing Red Army (Klausch , Zimmermann : -). In summing up Gypsy persecution inside the Reich, it is clear that the Wehrmacht's part in its implementation, though quite important, was nonetheless subordinate. Th e dominant persecutory agencies were the RSHA and its RKPA. Th e Criminal Police understood its function based on an essentially racist view of what constituted 'security' and the 'combating of crime, ' cooperating closely with the Research Institute for Race Hygiene within the Reich Health Offi ce.
Western Europe and Serbia
In the German-occupied territories, the Wehrmacht participated in Gypsy persecution more on its own initiative and enjoyed considerable freedom. Th is latitude had some connection with the German conduct of the war . Himmler's deportation order was the result of long and vehement discussions on central state level during the fall of  about the further development of Gypsy policy. Participants, in addition to the SS Führer himself, included the RKPA, the Research Institute for Race Hygiene, the Party Chancellery, the Race and Settlement Main Offi ce of the SS, and the SS Offi ce for ' Ancestral Inheritance' (Ahnenerbe), which here for the fi rst time, on Himmler's order, intervened in Gypsy policy. Th e order foresaw the deportation of Gypsies 'to a concentration camp. ' Th e RSHA, which was responsible for carrying out Himmler's order, chose the recently developed Auschwitz-Birkenau. Th e deportation involved Gypsies from Germany, Austria, Bohemia, and Moravia, from the Netherlands, Belgium, and northern France. and was partially the by-product of the structure of the German occupation administration, where the military at times played a decisive role.
In the Netherlands and Belgium, the German military administration showed little interest in the Gypsies. Orders mentioning them as a special group were issued in the early autumn of .
 Th ese stipulated that 'in order to combat espionage, ' Gypsies, stateless persons, members of the French Foreign Legion, German emigrants and others foreigners should be removed from the military 'security zone' along the coast. Th e situation in France diff ered from that in the Netherlands and Belgium in that the French government had itself already introduced coercive measures against the traveling population. In a decree of April , , the 'nomades' were stigmatized as potential traitors who might reveal military secrets to the Germans. Th eir transient way of life permitted them to observe and report troop movements, deployment sites and defense works to enemy agents. Consequently, for the duration of the war against Germany, they were enjoined from traveling about (Peschanski : -). In the autumn of , the German military administration tightened the screws, making these French measures far more severe. Nomades living in unoccupied areas of France were now no longer permitted to cross the line of demarcation; those in German-occupied France were to be 'transferred to collection camps. '  During the following years, some , persons stigmatized as nomades or tsiganes were incarcerated in camps, oft en under appalling conditions; such camps were ultimately under the control of the German military administration (Peschanski ).
While Gypsies in German-occupied Western Europe were subjected to harsh restrictions, in occupied Southeastern and Eastern Europe the very lives of Gypsies were in peril. Overall, this gradient dovetailed with the diff ering German war aims and practices in Western and Eastern Europe, which in Eastern Europe assumed the character of a racist war of annihilation. Th e Wehrmacht invaded Yugoslavia at the beginning of April . Th e country was partitioned and Serbia placed under German military administration, supervised by two staff s. Th e command staff was in charge of German combat units, while the administrative staff , headed by SS Lt. Gen. Harald Turner, superintended the provisional Serb government, the German fi eld and district commands, the mobile task force (Einsatzgruppe) of the Security Police and the Security Service and Reserve Police Battalion  of the Order Police (Browning :  ff .).
Serb resistance against the German occupation was initially low-key, but this changed aft er the massive German invasion of the Soviet Union on June , . In early July, an uprising of communist partisans lead by Tito erupted, surprising the occupiers by its magnitude. Right from the start, the tactics employed to defeat the partisans included 'reprisal executions. ' Already on June , , political prisoners suspected of being CP members and Jews were the fi rst 'hostages' executed in a bid to quash the uprising. Th e guidelines for reprisal policy issued by the Commanding General for Serbia at the beginning of October  upped the retaliatory ante. Now, for every German soldier or 'ethnic German' (Volksdeutscher) killed,  hostages would be shot; for every German soldier or 'ethnic German' wounded,  hostages were to be executed. Th e designated victims were males aged between  and . Th e executions were to be carried out wherever possible by the same units that had incurred losses in clashes with the partisans.

Since the Wehrmacht had too small a reservoir of victims for its 'reprisal executions, ' the Einsatzgruppe stationed in Belgrade was asked to 'provide' the 'requisite number' of , 'hostages' for  German soldiers who had been killed.  During the summer , the Einsatzgruppe hauled the Jews of Belgrade and the Banat into a 'transit camp' and herded a large group of Jewish refugees into the overcrowded Sabac concentration camp, where Gypsies were also being held. Th e commander of the Einsatzgruppe decided on the 'removal' of , Jews from Belgrade and  Jews and Gypsies from the Sabac camp for the 'reprisal executions. ' (Manoschek : -, -). Th e Roma in Serbia thus fell victim to the German 'retaliatory measures. ' Gen. Harald Turner, commander of the military administrative staff , proposed on October ,  that an additional , 'hostages' should be executed as retribution for ten soldiers recently killed and  wounded by 
Tito's partisans (Manoschek , -). One day later he wrote to his friend SS Lt. Gen. Richard Hildebrandt in Danzig:
About fi ve weeks ago, I lined the fi rst of  [Serbs] up against the wall. Since then we've liquidated another , in a mopping-up operation. In another mop-up we killed about , more. And in the meantime, over the past eight days, I've had , Jews and  Gypsies shot. According to the ratio : for German soldiers murdered in a barbaric manner. Another , are to be shot in the coming eight days, also almost only Jews. Th is is far from pleasant work! But it's necessary, we've got to make clear to people what it means to dare attack even a single German soldier. Besides, this is also the fastest way to solve the Jewish question.

Eight days later, under the pressure of new events, Turner was even more insistent on selecting Jewish and Gypsy victims for 'reprisal executions. ' In the meanwhile, two Wehrmacht units had applied the guidelines for retribution policy on their own, murdering some , in two Serb towns. In the light of this massacre, Turner and Faulmüller, chief of staff of the Commanding General, worked out new guidelines, issued on October , . Th ey prohibited 'indiscriminate arrests and executions of Serbs, ' since this only strengthened the rebels' hand. In future, in cases of doubt, it was fi rst necessary to obtain authorization from the superior offi ce before proceeding with the executions. On the other hand, Jews and Gypsies were a 'basic source of insecurity, thus endangering public order and safety. ' 'Jewish intellect' had 'conjured up this war'; consequently, it had to be 'destroyed. ' And 'given his internal disposition and external construction, the Gypsy . . . could not be a useful member of the community of nations. ' According to Turner, the 'Jewish element . . . had a signifi cant hand in directing the gangs, ' and 'Gypsies in particular' bore responsibility 'for special atrocities and providing intelligence. '  Turner's order, which fused anti-Jewish and anti-Gypsy clichés with biologistic racism, provided carte blanche for the shooting of all Jewish males and numerous Roma. Th is meshed with the thinking of the Wehrmacht command in Serbia. It was also their view that the indiscriminate execution of Serbs diminished the occupier's latitude for action. On the other hand, the military command wished to adhere to the quota of  dead hostages for every dead German soldier and  hostages for every soldier wounded. So there were no reservations about executing Jews and Gypsies. In the ideological phantasms dominant in the Wehrmacht's mind-set, the Jews were in any case the arch-enemies of the Reich, colluding with the communists in the cabal of a 'Jewish-Bolshevik world conspiracy. ' T he Gypsies were conceived to be spies operating in the service of the putative Jewish-communist adversary (Browning :  ff ., Manoschek : -).
Th e next 'reprisal execution' corresponded to the pattern indicated by Turner. Since the total number of available Jews no longer even amounted to ,, some  Roma were seized in Belgrade in order to fi ll the fi xed quota of , victims.
 Th e fi rst shootings were carried out on October  and ,  by th Company, Infantry Regiment , commanded by First Lt. Hans-Dietrich Walther. Two days later, he reported to his superiors. Walther complained that the trucks put at his disposal by Field HQ  for transporting Jews and Gypsies were 'unsuitable, ' since they 'had no canopy or awning, so that the city's inhabitants could see who we were taking and where we were going. ' On the other hand, he had nothing but praise for the choice of the execution site: it was 'very convenient, ' since any 'attempt by prisoners to fl ee' could be 'prevented by a small number of men. ' Th e sandy soil there was also 'very suitable': it facilitated the 'digging of pits' and thus shortened the 'amount of working time' necessary for the operation. What required the most time was digging the pits, 'while the execution itself went off very fast:  persons in  minutes. ' 'Jews face death calmly-they stand very quietly-while Gypsies cry and shriek and are constantly writhing about, even standing at the place of execution. Some even jumped into the pit before the shots were fi red and tried to pass themselves off for dead. ' Walther summed up:
Initially it didn't phase my men. But by the second day it was already apparent that some don't have the nerves for executions over a longer period. My personal impression is that people are not troubled by inhibitions during the actual shooting. But aft er a while, in the quiet of the evening, when you get to thinking about it you begin to feel something.

A week later the unit was ordered to carry out a third shooting. Walther subsequently requested to be relieved of execution duty: the mental strain was too great. Some of the succeeding executions were assigned to another Wehrmacht unit, others to the th Reserve Police Battalion (Manoschek : ) . Almost simultaneously with these murders, the German troops gained the upper hand over Tito's partisans. On December , , a lower 'retaliatory quota' was ordered, slashing the fi gure by half: now there were to be  victims for every German or 'ethnic German' soldier killed, the toll of  victims for each soldier wounded. Along with 'unarmed communists' and 'criminals, ' Gypsies and Jews were blanketed as 'retribution prisoners' (Sühne gefangene).
 In the following years, numerous Roma were to fall victim to German 'reprisal executions' (Ackovic : , Kenrick and Puxon : -).
At the same time, the German authorities were faced with a new question: what was to be done with Jewish women, children and the elderly and Roma women and children whose husbands and fathers had been shot? At the end of October , they decided on a temporary solution, the construction of a camp in Semlin (Zemun) on the bank of the Sava River opposite Belgrade. Th e Southeastern Army command expressly endorsed the proposal. In the meantime, it apparently also considered women, children and the elderly as spies or informants for the communist partisans. On December , , the Jews and most probably the Gypsies as well were transported to Semlin, now under the command of the German Security Police. Yugoslav authorities estimate the number of Jews incarcerated there at ,, along with  Roma women and children.

In the spring of , the Jewish prisoners were gassed in an extermination van brought in especially for the purpose from Germany. Th e regular ten-day reports fi led by the authorized Commanding General in Serbia kept a precise record of the continuously declining number of Jewish concentration camp prisoners.
 By contrast, the Roma women and children were released from Semlin. Th e exact date of this release remains unclear. In his  trial, the former Semlin commandant Herbert Andorfer testifi ed he recalled that the Roma were released immediately prior to the beginning of the murder of the Jewish women and children, thus in March  (Manoschek : , Zimmermann :  ff .). Yet memory can oft en be deceptive when it comes to time. So it is also conceivable that the decision to spare Roma women and children was linked with a discussion between Himmler and Heydrich held on April , , recorded in Himmler's service diary with the words: 'No extermination of the Gypsies' (Dienstkalender : ). Th is entry by the Reichsführer-SS could help to explain the release of Roma from Semlin, an action whose motives have remained to date obscure. In , Himmler began to develop interest in the Indian origin of the Gypsies. Th is led him to the notion that among the Roma, there was a small group of 'racially pure' Gypsies who, because they had originated in India, were bonafi de ' Aryans' (Zimmermann : -, Margalit , Lewy ). Although Himmler's diary entry does not have the force of a basic policy decision, seen from this vantage, that brief entry points up the diff erences the SS leadership made in extermination policy vis-à-vis Jews and Gypsies.
Aft er the Jews held in Semlin were murdered, the local Security Police commander proudly declared Belgrade to be the only large city in Europe 'free of Jews. '  Gen. Turner, his infl uence in the German power structure in Serbia on the wane, tried to off set this by accentuating real or imaginary activities of his own initiative (Browning : ) . He went further, claiming at the end of August  to Gen. Löhr, Wehrmacht Commander Southeast in Salonika, that 'Serbia was the only country where the Jewish question and the Gypsy question had been solved. '  But in regard to the Roma, Turner was wrong. Fortunately, the murder of Gypsies was still limited in scope. According to available sources, down to the spring of , the Wehrmacht and police in Serbia had shot between , and , Roma. Even assuming a substantial number of unreported victims over the course of the war, and thus a far higher total, the great majority of Serb Roma survived the German extermination policy. In , even German newspapers indicated the number of Roma in Serbia to be an estimated ,, declaring it a 'question' that had to be 'solved as soon and as thoroughly as possible. '  . BAB, R -Serbien-, fol. . . IfZ, MA-, fols. -, Presentation by Turner,  Aug. , at WB-Südost, Generaloberst Löhr, fols.  ff .
. Donauzeitung,  Jan. , Krakauer Zeitung,  June .
In the Soviet Union
While the SS Einsatzgruppen in Serbia had selected the Gypsy victims and the Wehrmacht units had then proceeded with their execution, murder operations in the USSR involved a change of roles: the Einsatzgruppen tended to be executioners behind the front while the Wehrmacht fi gured primarily as accomplices.
Testimony by Otto Ohlendorf, commander of Einsatzgruppe D, at the Nuremberg Tribunal aft er the war cast light on the reasons mustered to legitimate the murder of Gypsies in the USSR. Ohlenberg's line of defense in - argued (a) that he was acting under orders and (b) that a general murder order for the Einsatzgruppen had been issued shortly before the beginning of Operation Barbarossa and the attack on the Soviet Union.

While the truth of this apologia is diffi cult to uphold in the light of historical research (Streim : -, -, Ogorreck : -), Ohlendorf 's remarks on the motives underlying the murder of the Gypsies may be of greater historical relevance. In the course of the Nuremberg Einsatzgruppen trial in October , he stated that it had been the mission of these groups 'to protect the rear of the troops by killing Jews, Gypsies, communist functionaries, active communists and all others who could pose a threat to security' (Krausnick and Wilhelm: ) . Ohlendorf thus tried to legitimate the murder of Jews and Gypsies in connection with the need to ensure the security of the German troops. Yet the structure of his argumentation reveals the patently racist character of these murders: at the latest from midAugust  on, the Einsatzgruppen considered Jews and Gypsies prima facie as 'elements' posing a threat to security.
In commenting specifi cally on the Gypsies, Ohlendorf noted that the same regulations had been valid both for them and the Jews. Gypsy children had 'to be murdered' just like their parents, since the intent of their extermination was to 'bring about a lasting state of security . . . not just a momentary one. ' As 'the children of parents who had been killed, ' they posed 'no less danger' to the Germans 'than their parents themselves. ' In addition, Ohlendorf cited the time-worn cliché of espionage as a motive for the murder, applied equally to Jews and Gypsies: just as 'the Jew . . . had performed espionage services for both sides in all wars, ' the Gypsies, 'as a non-sedentary population, ' were 'psychologically predisposed to changing locations. '  Th is accorded with statements made by the Einsatzgruppen during the war in seeking to legitimate the shooting of Gypsies. Th ey cobbled an instrumental ligature between the customary anti-Gypsy stereotypes with the German conduct of the war and the German occupation regime. Along with stigmatizing the Gypsies as 'asocial, ' notorious thieves and 'alien elements, ' coupled with the claim that they represented 'an encumbrance in every respect, ' they thus made special use of the standing cliché that Gypsies practiced espionage and had links with the partisans.

Along with Jews, functionaries of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), partisans and other 'undesirable elements, ' Gypsies were indeed among the victims of the SS Einsatzgruppen on Soviet soil. Th eir initial target group had been Jews in the Soviet state and Party bureaucracy, the Jewish intelligentsia and any Jews considered ready to off er resistance. Yet already during the fi rst month of the Soviet campaign, the Einsatzgruppen seized on a further group as victims for executions in 'retaliation' for real or imputed opposition in the population: in the main, Jewish urban males of military service age. In the face of stepped-up activity by Soviet partisans in the late summer of , and probably also in line with the German aim to press forward to a 'fi nal victory' over the Soviet Union before the onset of winter, the Einsatzgruppen radicalized their praxis: the practical objective was total extermination of the Jewish population in the occupied Soviet Union. At the same time, the mobile killing units expanded carnage to include Gypsy victims (Gerlach : -, -) .
Th e activity of the Einsatzgruppen was based on a hierarchically articulated image of the enemy. At its apex were Jews and communists and their phantasmal meld in the form of a 'Jewish-Bolshevik world conspiracy. ' In this ideological pyramid, Gypsies occupied a subordinate though not insignifi cant rung. Th ey fi gured as 'racially inferior, ' purportedly 'asocial, ' as 'partisans, ' 'spies, ' and 'agents' of the imaginary 'Jewish world enemy. ' Viewed by the Einsatzgruppen as fi ft h-column informers in the service of 'Jewish Bolshevism, ' they targeted traveling Roma in particular whenever the killing units learned of their existence. Regarded solely as auxiliaries of the 'world enemy, ' their liquidation was not given fi rst priority. Th e Einsatzgruppen murdered the Gypsies who fell into their hands, but did not search for them with the zeal employed in ferreting out Jews and communists. Rather, as refl ected in the formulations in diverse Einsatzgruppen reports, the Gypsies were 'handed over' to them by the Wehrmacht, reported to them by the Russian population, seized during 'inspection of a prison, ' killed in the course of general 'inspections' of the civilian population in rear areas near the front or 'picked up' by a detachment 'en route' to its next appointed station.

But when the killing units lingered in an area longer-term, as in the case of Einsatzgruppe D in the Crimea, they also began systematic liquidation of the Gypsy population. In Crimea, more than , Roma fell victim to Einsatzgruppe D, concentrated especially in the capital city of Simferopol. Th is Crimean case also exemplifi es the role played by the Eastern Army in this slaughter. Simferopol had a Gypsy quarter; in November and December , a registry of its residents was prepared. One December day, the Roma were dragged from their homes, guarded by - armed German members of the Order Police. Th ey were herded onto trucks driven up at short intervals. Th ese vehicles had been provided by the Wehrmacht. Th eir drivers, co-drivers and armed escorts were likewise Wehrmacht personnel. Th e place of execution was sealed off by members of the Wehrmacht military police and Einsatzkommando  b.
 Men from Einsatzgruppe D forced them to climb down from the trucks. Th eir coats, furs, money and valuables were confi scated. Assembled in groups, the Roma were led to the edge of an anti-tank trench some two meters deep. It had been excavated by a Wehrmacht sapper using high explosives. Several fi ring squads, each commanded by an SS offi cer, rotated at the line. In this manner, over the course  Th e Eastern Army did not only furnish organizational and technical assistance in such executions-oft en it also acted to initiate the Gypsy liquidations and delivered numerous victims into the hands of the SS mobile killing units. Th us, for example, in the 'General Instructions on the Application of Military Administrative Order' for the Soviet Union, issued in October , it is stated that 'itinerant Gypsies' earned their 'sustenance mainly by means of theft and robbery in remote localities. ' For that reason, they were 'to be taken into custody and handed over to the nearest Einsatzkommando of the Security Police and SD. '  Precise orders with an identical content, for example, were also issued by the Commanding General, Northern Rear Army Area. In the late autumn of , he ordered 'sedentary Gypsies resident for two years in their locality' and against whom there were 'no political or criminal suspicions, ' to be 'left ' there. On the other hand, 'itinerant Gypsies' were to be 'delivered over to the nearest Einsatzkommando of the Security Service. '
 If the vague formulation contra the 'sedentary Gypsies' covered any potential denunciation that might be directed to the Einsatzgruppen, the order against wandering Roma indicates that the Wehrmacht, in a division of labor with the Einsatzgruppen, actively abetted the murder of traveling Gypsies.
An analogous pattern of murder also can de demonstrated for Latvia and the Generalgouvernement. Th ere too, Gypsies considered by the German police, the occupation administration and the military to be itinerant were in greater danger than sedentary Roma (Wippermann : -, Zimmermann : -, Pohl : ). In fact, Nazi Gypsy policy outside the the custody of the Einsatzgruppen.
 Since no fundamental question was thus raised about the execution itself, but only as regards the unauthorized manner in which it had been carried out by the Novorzhev local command, the shootings were ultimately deemed a marginal matter and were not punished by any disciplinary sanctions.
Conclusion
In the light of the above, there can be no doubt about the Wehrmacht's complicity in Gypsy persecution. Inside the Reich, the OKW was actively involved in the social exclusion of Gypsies. Th e military authorities showed no interest in, let alone active concern for the fate of former soldiers from this group deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau as 'Gypsies' and most particularly 'Gypsy Mischlinge. ' In Serbia, the Wehrmacht contributed substantially to establishing mass shooting as the principal policy toward both the Jews and the Roma. Th ere were probably fewer inhibitions on killing there than in the Soviet Union because the murders in Serbia tended to be rationalized as revenge or retaliation for German casualties.
In the USSR, by contrast, Wehrmacht units were less frequently directly implicated in the extermination of Gypsies. But the military police, secret military police and the rear area Sicherungsdivisionen in particular handed over 'itinerant Gypsies' to the SS Einsatzgruppen to be shot. Over and above, Wehrmacht units provided considerable organizational and technical assistance in conjunction with the executions perpetrated by the Einsatzgruppen.
What psychological processes accompanied the mass murder in Serbia and its active promotion in the occupied Soviet Union? A primary factor was the military principle of obedience to orders; it acted to deaden the independent thought and stirrings of the individual's conscience. Especially in the USSR, the division of labor in the extermination operations also played a crucial role, since it both absolved those responsible while freeing them from moral inhibitions. Th e military authorities who were accesso- 
